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DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
gate the prejudicial effects of introducing evidence of a prior criminal
record by strictly limiting such evidence to those crimes that bear the
highest degree of relevance to the present charges.
With the exception of the points discussed above, Stanley is essen-
tially a reaffirmation of prior North Carolina law with greater reliance
on the federal definition of entrapment. 4 Except for extreme cases,
the issue remains one for the jury to resolve. The court also
announced in Stanley that it will continue to focus on the particular
defendant's predisposition to participate in the criminal act. However,
the North Carolina court has recognized that abuses inevitably occur
when overzealous law enforcement officers set traps, particularly in
search of violations of drug laws. In correcting these abuses, it is hoped
that the court, recognizing the need for judicial intervention, will con-
tinue to search for the appropriate responses.
JOSEPH D. JOHNSON
Criminal Law-Diminished Responsibility, Long Ignored in
North Carolina, Is Given a Hearing But Not Yet Adopted
North Carolina has never recognized the doctrine of "diminished
responsibility," by which a mentally disordered defendant may be
deemed incapable of the degree of mens rea required for conviction of
the crime for which he is charged, even though his mental illness does
not reach the level of insanity.' In three recent cases2 the North
Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that it remains unwilling to adopt
64. See 288 N.C. at 29-32, 215 S.E.2d at 595-97.
1. The doctrine herein referred to as "diminished responsibility" goes by several
different names, including "diminished capacity," "partial insanity" and "partial responsi-
bility." F. LinmAN & D. McIN'nRE, Tim MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 355
(1961); People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 364, 406 P.2d 43, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763,
772 (1965). In addition, the term "diminished reponsibility" is used to describe a quite
different doctrine derived from civil and Scottish law whereby the defendant's punish-
ment is reduced if he could not resist the criminal impulse. Id. Despite this confusion
and the fact that the doctrine "contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for
the crime actually committed," State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314
(1959), "diminished responsibility" is probably the most common term and is the one
used by the North Carolina Supreme Court. E.g., State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 699,
174 S.E.2d 526, 532 (1970).
2. State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975); State v. Wetmore,
287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975); State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305
(1975).
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the theory, at least under the label "diminished responsibility." Never-
theless, the courts statement in State v. Cooper that one who lacks the
mental capacity to premeditate and deliberate cannot lawfully be con-
victed of first degree murder' appears to acknowledge the basic theory
underlying diminished responsibility, perhaps opening the way for
that doctrine in North Carolina.
In Cooper the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife
and four of his children.' The trial court properly instructed the jury
on insanity as a complete defense5 and on the elements of first and
second degree murder.' The jury was not instructed to consider the
evidence of the defendant's mental disorder as it affected the elements of
premeditation and deliberation, but the defendant did not request such
an instruction.7 The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder despite considerable evidence that he was a paranoid schizo-
phrenic. 8
The supreme court, over a strong dissent by Chief Justice Sharp,
held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury to consider the
evidence of defendant's mental disorder on the question of premedita-
tion and deliberation did not amount to reversible error.0 The court
said that "a defendant who does not have the mental capacity to form an
intent to kill, or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, cannot
be lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental
deficiency be due to a disease of the mind. . . or some other cause."'1
However, since the jury's verdict established that the defendant had the
menial capacity to know right from wrong at the time of the killings, the
court reasoned that it "necessarily follows that he had the lesser, includ-
ed capacity" to intend to kill." The court also noted that the jury, after
"proper instructions as to what constitutes premeditation and delibera-
tion," determined that the defendant "did, in fact, premeditate and
deliberate upon the intended killings.' Accordingly, the court found
no error of omission in the trial court's charge. 1"
3. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
4. Id. at 552, 213 S.E.2d at 308.
5. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
6. 286 N.C. at 570-71, 213 S.E.2d at 319-20.
7. Id. at 595, 213 S.E.2d at 334 (dissenting opinion).
8. Id. at 552-64, 213 S.E.2d at 308-15.
9. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 573, 213 S.E.2d at 321.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
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Chief Justice Sharp agreed with the majority that a person with a
mental disorder that prevents his acting with premeditation and deliber-
ation cannot be guilty of murder in the first degree. However, she said
the defendant was entitled to the instruction the majority found unneces-
sary.' 4 She would require such an instruction in many such homicide
cases even when defense counsel failed to request it:
,[An instruction would be required in any case] in which proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent to kill, formed after
premeditation and deliberation, is prerequisite to a conviction for
murder in the first degree, and . ..in which there is substantial
evidence that at the time of the homicide defendant had been and
was suffering from a recognized serious mental disease and en-
gaged in abnormal behavior characteristic of such disease. 15
Accordingly, a first degree murder defendant who could not be convict-
ed by use of the felony-murder rule would be entitled to a diminished
responsibility instruction if his acts were characteristic of a serious
mental disorder.
In State v. Wetmore'6 the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that several states had adopted the theory of diminished responsibility,
but the court did not consider the matter further because the defendant
admitted in his brief that North Carolina had not adopted the doctrine.' 7
Despite the lack of discussion in Wetmore the court said in State v.
Shepherd,8 "In Wetmore our Court discussed, but clearly did not adopt
. . .the theory of diminished responsibility."' 9
Prior to 1975 the court specifically referred to diminished responsi-
bility only once.20 Although a number of jurisdictions have adopted the
theory,' the only test of criminal responsibility utilized by North Caroli-
na courts to measure a state of mind has been the M'Naghten insanity
14. Id. at 595, 213 S.E.2d at 334-35.
15. Id. at 592, 213 S.E.2d at 332.
16. 287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E.2d 51 (1975).
17. Id. at 356, 215 S.E.2d at 58. The court also cited Cooper, both for its
restatement of the M'Naghten rule and for its discussion of diminished responsibility, but
it only implied that Cooper rejected the doctrine. Id. at 357, 215 S.E.2d at 58. In
Wetmore the defendant took the stand and in effect admitted premeditation. Thus,
despite her dissent in Cooper, Chief Justice Sharp agreed that the defendant was not
entitled to a diminished responsibility instruction. Id. at 358-59, 215 S.E.2d at 59-60.
18. 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d 176 (1975).
19. Id. at 349, 218 S.E.2d at 176.
20. In State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970), the court noted in
dictum that several states had adopted a diminished responsibility theory. Id. at 699,
174 S.E.2d at 532.
21. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
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rule.2" Under the M'Naghten rule a mentally disordered defendant is
exempt from criminal responsibility "only if, at the time he commits the
act which would otherwise be illegal, he was incapable of knowing the
nature and quality of his act or of distinguishing between right and
wrong with relation thereto."28  A defendant who does not meet the
insanity test is considered wholly sane and fully responsible for the
consequences of his acts, for "there is no halfway house on the road to
insanity.' '24
It is a common law principle "that the state of mind with which a
person commits a criminal act is material in determining not only
whether he should be punished therefor, but also, if he is to be punished,
how severly."25 From this principle, which is manifest in any classifi-
cation of offenses according to degree of mens rea, some jurisdictions
have derived the doctrine of diminished responsibility. 20 These jurisdic-
tions have said, in effect, that a defendant who was incapable of
entertaining the state of mind required for the commission of a crime
cannot logically be found guilty of that crime.27 If this reasoning were
carried to its logical conclusion, a defendant totally incapable of even a
general intent should be absolved of all guilt. In practice, however,
diminished responsibility is used only -to negate specific intent, "allowing
conviction for any lesser-included offense which dogs not have the
requirement of a particular mental element."28
Many states, including North Carolina, have allowed intoxication
to negate the elements of premeditation and deliberation necessary for
conviction of first degree murder.29 Those jurisdictions that have
adopted diminished responsibility have often been persuaded to do so
because of the anomalous result of allowing the alcohol or drug user
more lenient treatment than is afforded a defendant with a mental
22. See State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 513-14, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1974). In
1915 the supreme court suggested that lack of capacity to form a criminal intent would
be a complete defense to crime. State v. Cooper, 170 N.C. 719, 723, 87 S.E. 50, 52
(1915). Nevertheless, the M'Naghten rule was set out immediately following this
suggestion, so it is doubtful that the court intended to propose an alternate or supplemen-
tal test for criminal capacity.
23. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 652, 174 S.E.2d 793, 800 (1970).
24. State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 514, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1974).
25. H. W oOFEN, MEmAL DisoRDas ASA CRimiNAL DEFENSE 177 (1954).
26. See id.
27. Comment, Mental Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: The Recommenda-
tions of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 482, 492
(1955).
28. Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Nol, 8 HOUSTON L. Rav. 629, 634
(1971).
29. E.g., State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 71-72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968).
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disorder he cannot control.3 0 The statement in Cooper that a defendant
cannot be convicted of first degree murder if he lacked the requisite
capacity "due to a disease of the mind, intoxication. . . or some other
cause"31 indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court was aware of
this anomaly.
Diminished responsibility has been used most commonly in murder
cases, to reduce the defendant's crime from first to second degree
murder.32 Thus, under California's "rule of diminished responsibility"
a defendant who was "suffering from a mental illness that prevented his
acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation!
cannot be convicted of first degree murder.33 A similar rule has been
adopted in the District of Columbia 4 and in about one third of the
states.3 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court specifically stated in Cooper:
"[A] defendant who does not have the mental capacity to form an
intent to kill, or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, cannot
be lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental
deficiency be due to a disease of the mind.. . or some other cause."36
Although the court did not use the term "diminished responsibility," this
language in Cooper is similar to that used by courts in California and
other states.37 Consequently, it appears that North Carolina may be on
its way toward adopting diminished responsibility, notwithstanding the
admission in defendant's brief in Wetmore and the reliance thereon in
Shepherd.
The defining language in Cooper is only dictum, because the
evidentiary question was not before the court, and a diminished respon-
sibility instruction was found unnecessary. Nevertheless, the statement
that a defendant who is unable to premeditate "cannot be lawfully
convicted" of first degree murder apparently means, at a minimum, that
evidence of mental disorder is relevant to the premeditation issue in first
degree murder cases. If this is true, a defendant whose mental disorder
30. E.g., State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 294, 347 P.2d 312, 315 (1959).
31. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
32. F. LXNDMAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 1, at 355.
33. People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 423 P.2d 777, 781, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625,
629 (1967).
34. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1000-02 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane).
35. E.g., State v. Santiago, 55 Hawaii 152, 516 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (1973); see
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1246-52 (1968).
36. 286 N.C. at 572, 213 S.E.2d at 320.
37. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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does not reach the level of insanity should be free to introduce evidence
to prove his lack of capacity to premeditate.
Of the states that have adopted diminished responsibility only
California3 8 requires a diminished responsibility instruction on the trial
court's motion whenever it appears the defendant is relying on the
doctrine.30 Although it acknowledged in Cooper the relevance of men-
tal illness to the premeditation issue, the court indicated that North
Carolina is not ready to join California in requiring a diminished
responsibility instruction. New York has refused to require such an
instruction on the ground that it is self-evident to a jury "that a defend-
ant who cannot deliberate does not deliberate. '40 The majority in
Cooper arrived at the same result as the New York court by taking "ju-
dicial notice of the well known fact that a dog. . . may have the mental
capacity to intend to kill." Accordingly, the Cooper court observed that
"[it requires less mental ability to form a purpose to do an act than to
determine its moral quality."41  Employing these postulates the court
determined that the jury's verdict of guilty established that the defendant
had the lesser capacity to intend to kill.42
Although the court may be correct in finding that diminished re-
sponsibility instructions are not required, the manner in which the re-
sult was reached presents two problems. The first is that the court's
reference to a dog's intent to kill obviously refers only to the general
intent found in all criminal acts, since a dog surely does not have the
capacity to premeditate and deliberate or to possess malice afore-
thought. The reference to a dog's general intent has no place in a dis-
cussion of diminished responsibility, for that doctrine has been applied
to specific intent crimes only. The second problem is that the court,
in its statement that less mental ability is required to form a purpose
to do an act than to determine its moral quality, seems to be recogniz-
ing a theory that should not be judicially noticed, since it is not well
1
38. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 492, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,
82 (1963) (en bane).
39. New Mexico says that such an instruction is required, but it is not clear' that
the trial court must act on its own motion. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 293-96, 347
P.2d 312, 315-16 (1959). Several other states seem to be close to the position that a
diminished responsibility instruction is required. See, e.g., State v. Donahue, 141 Conn.
656, 663-65, 109 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1954); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 138-40, 126
N.W.2d 285, 291 (1964); State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J. 44, 62-66, 202 A.2d 657, 666-68
(1964).
40. People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E.553 (1928) (per curiam).




established or authoritatively settled.43
As Chief Justice Sharp's dissent makes clear, Cooper was a first
degree murder case in which the defendant had a history of mental
disorder and engaged in abnormal behavior characteristic of that disor-
der at the time of the killing." Unfortunately the majority did not
discuss diminished responsibility in this context. Instead, by its refer-
ence to general intent crimes, the court indicated that it was unaware
that diminished responsibility has ordinarily been applied to specific
intent crimes only.
Under the North Carolina homicide statute a murder without
deliberation is a lesser crime than murder with deliberation. 45 The state
of the criminal law under this statute provides the prime opportunity to
ameliorate the all-or-nothing nature of North Carolina's insanity defense
without disrupting the purposes of the criminal law. At a first degree
murder trial, when evidence of mental disorder is introduced to show
insanity, a jury that finds that a defendant was sane will then determine
whether he premeditated and deliberated upon the act. In such a case
(of which Cooper is an example) it is arguable that, even in the absence
of a diminished responsibility instruction, the jury will consider the
defendant's mental disorder on the issue of deliberation. A finding that
a defendant did deliberate presupposes a finding that he could deliber-
ate.
On the other hand, if there is no doubt that at the time of his act a
43. "A matter is the proper subject of judicial notice only if is 'known,' well
established, and authoritatively settled." Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 506, 142
S.E.2d 361, 366 (1965). The court in Hughes recognized, however, that when the
information is not "the controlling or even a significant basis for decision" but is merely
"rhetorical and illustrative," appellate courts are not bound by the restrictive judicial
notice rule that governs adjudicative facts. See id. at 507, 142 S:E.2d at 366. Neverthe-
less, it appears that if the court in Cooper had not beleived that it requires less mental
ability to form a purpose than to tell right from wrong, it would have required a
diminished responsibility instruction. Because the court's statement controlled its deci-
sion, the court should have been surer of its factual basis before invoking judicial notice.
If we define morality to include "the idea of predicting the consequences of our
actions and being responsible for them," a certain mental level is, of course, necessary
for moral behavior. N. WILmAMs & S. WmILiAs, TAE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CHLDREN 106 (1970). If this is what the court meant to say, judicial notice might have
been appropriate. However, if determining the moral quality of one's acts implies that
one will stop those acts if they injure someone else, it is not 'established" that
determining moral quality requires less mental ability than forming a purpose. Certain
scientific experiments have demonstrated that rats and monkeys will forego pleasure to
themselves if their actions cause discomfort to other animals. S. DimorD, THE SocrAL
BEHAvioR OF ANImALs 119-23 (1970).
44. 286 N.C. at 595-96, 213 S.E.2d at 334-35.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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defendant knew right from wrong with respect to it, he cannot claim
insanity. Accordingly, in a jurisdiction in which the only means of
testing criminal capacity is the M'Naughten insanity test, such a defend-
ant has no opportunity to introduce evidence of mental disorder. If a
defendant who is insane nevertheless lacks the capacity to premeditate
and deliberate, he ought to be allowed to introduce evidence to show
his lack of capacity. If he is not allowed to introduce such evidence, he
could be convicted of first degree murder though he lacked the capacity
to premeditate at the time of the act. A refusal to admit evidence of
lack of capacity is justifiable only if it is true that one who is sane
necessarily.possesses the mental capacity to premeditate; however, it is
questionable that knowledge of right and wrong presupposes that capac-
ity. Since the insanity test is inapplicable to those defendants who are
not insane but who do not possess the requisite capacity, North Carolina
would do well to supplement its insanity test with diminished responsi-
bility, at least in first degree murder cases. 46
The only diminished responsibility issue in Cooper was whether the
trial court must on its own motion instruct the jury to consider evidence
of the defendant's mental disorder on the question of premeditation and
deliberation. The answer given in Cooper was that the trial court need
not give this instruction on its own motion.47
Cooper also indicates that North Carolina acknowledges the under-
lying premise of diminished responsibility: a defendant so mentally
disordered that he does not have the capacity to premeditate cannot be
lawfully convicted of first degree murder. Conversely, Cooper, Wet-
more and Shepherd show that North Carolina is willing to dismiss
diminished responsibility without fully considering it. To date the
North Carolina Supreme Court has had occasion to discuss the doctrine
46. One argument against diminished responsibility is that the defendant who is
convicted of a lesser degree of crime because of mental disorder will be released from
prison sooner than the supposedly less dangerous criminal who is mentally normal. The
statute that provides for the involuntary commitment of dangerous defendants acquitted
on grounds of mental illness could not be used against one found guilty, but of a lesser
crime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). However, because diminished
responsibility is being considered in North Carolina only to reduce the defendant's crime
from first to second degree murder, he may still receive a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Of course, the benefits of
diminished responsibility in murder cases would be negligible if capital punishment were
abolished. See F. LINMAN & D. MciNbRmE, supra note 1, at 355-57, for a survey of the
arguments for and against recognizing the defense of diminished responsibility.
47. See text accompanying notes 9 & 13 supra. The court did not have to consider
the case that would arise if the trial court, after counsel had tried to persuade the jury
that there was evidence of insanity, exercised its right to instruct that there was no such
evidence. State v. Melvin, 219 N.C. 538, 540, 14 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1941).
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only with reference to instructions in cases in which the defendant,
having pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, has already introduced
evidence of mental disorder. Hopefully, when the issue presented to
the court is the admissibility of such evidence to show lack of capacity
to premeditate, the court will give diminished responsibility more serious
consideration.
JOHN H. BODDIE
Criminal Law-Sua Sponte Instructions on Defendant's Failure
to Testify
Section 8-54 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that a
defendant in a criminal action is a competent witness but that the
defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf "shall not create any
presumption against him."' In several decisions,' the most recent of
which is State v. Caron,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court has dealt
with the issue of whether it is error under section 8-54 for the judge, on
his own initiative, to instruct the jury that the defendant has a right not to
testify and that no adverse inference is to be drawn from the defendant's
silence. Other state and federal courts, dealing with similar statutes,
have divided4 as to whether such an instruction, given without a defend-
ant's request, so sensitizes the jury to the defendant's silence that an
inference of guilt may arise or an existing adverse inference may be
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969) provides:
Defendant in criminal action competent but not compellable to testify.
-In the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings against per-
sons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses or misdemeanors, the
person so charged is, at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent
witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him. But every such person examined as a witness shall be subject
to cross-examination as other witnesses. Except as above provided, nothing in
this section shall render any person, who in any criminal proceeding is charged
with the commission of a criminal offense, competent or compellable to give
evidence against himself, nor render any person compellable to answer any
question tending to criminate himself.
2. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974); State v. Bryant, 283
N.C. 227, 195 S.E.2d 509 (1973); State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 180 S.E.2d 115
(1971); State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d 522 (1968); State v. Rainey, 236 N.C.
738, 74 S.E.2d 39 (1953); State v. Wood, 230 N.C. 740, 55 S.E.2d 491 (1949); State v.
McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E.2d 733 (1948); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 5 S.E.2d
156 (1939); State v. Home, 209 N.C. 725, 184 S.E. 470 (1936).
3. 288 N.C. 467, 219 S.E.2d 68 (1975).
4. See Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968) for a compilation of these cases.
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